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Abstract
The paper develops a systematic reflection about
the future of smart cites at the time of Covid-19,
starting from an original periodization about the
evolution of the concept of smartness, declined through
a four fold analytical tool (technological, humansocial,
institutional
and
spatial-environmental
dimensions). Focusing on the role of smart citizens and
on the “right to the city” concept, we list and critically
appraise the emerging trends made visible by the
worldwide sanitary crisis.

1. Introduction
This paper aims at developing a systematic but
innovative reflection on a long established, but always
evolving topic, such as the future of smart cities (SC).
We believe it was a needed effort after more than two
decades of debates around the concept of smartness –
declined either as more technological or human – and
the more recent and intertwining stream of research on
the sharing economy. Yet, today, an urgent and
mandatory reflection is needed upon the pandemic’s
implications we still are discovering. Therefore, we
build an original theoretical and methodological
framework that will sustain and guide us through the
contribution that is divided in two parts: the first offers
a periodization of the evolving concept of SC while the
second aligns it to those of citizenship and right to the
city. Building on the most relevant literature on SC, we
aim at updating and positioning the debate while
developing an interpretative reading key for we might
see in the near future.
The first part will rely on, and also innovate, the
tripartite analytical tool developed by Pardo and Nam
[1]: to the technological, human and institutional
dimensions we add a forth that relates to space and
environment, while enlarging the human to a more
comprehensive social dimension. We propose a threephase periodization analyzed through the lenses of
these 4 dimensions. If for the first two phases we
render and propose the debates developed over 25
years based on data analyzed through an original
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systematic review, for the third phase we list, speculate
and critically appraise the emerging trends made
visible by the worldwide sanitary crisis. The second
part of this contribution builds on the concept of smart
citizenship offering an original angle tighten up to the
concept of “right to the city”. Focusing on the role of
citizens for the right to a (smart) city is especially
urgent since we suddenly entered a third unplanned,
not technologically driven, phase. Our contribution
bears 3 points of originality: a novel periodization; the
conceptualization of a “smart citizenship”; and the
sketch of pressing problems for the “Post-pandemic”
Smart City.

2. The theoretical framework
The concept of SC evolved and started to be
applied as a normative and ideological claim without
sufficient conceptual clarification on what it really
means. The variety of SC narratives changes according
to latitudes [2]: in the global North, the label is
therefore adopted to redefine the existing urban
infrastructure (often in parallel to a privatization of
services and spaces), while in the global South it is
used as a political frame for the construction of new
cities through an increasingly government led
technological urbanization. To set the table for our
position paper we need to formulate a specific
theoretical framework, building on Pardo and Nam [1]
(for the first part), Dahrendorf [3] and Lefebvre [4] (for
the second part).
According to Pardo and Nam, understanding the
phenomenon of SC, requires a multidimensional scope
that looks beyond a technocratic and cyber-enthusiastic
vision that matches the citizen centric neoliberal view
of SC [5]. The novel approach distinguishes: a
technology dimension relating to the implementation
of infrastructures (especially ICT) to improve and
transform life and work; a human dimension referring
to people, education, and knowledge as key drivers for
innovation and reconfiguration of existing processes;
an institutional dimension calling for specific smart
environment’s governance and policies to better design
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SC initiatives. However, previous analysis partially
overlooked the spatial-environmental dimension that
appears increasingly crucial in many definitions.
Therefore, the concept of SC makes a strong reference
to the theme of sustainability, to the point that its
genesis is also traced back to the contents of the Kyoto
Protocol in 2005, and highlighted in subsequent
documents like the Covenant of Mayors in 2008, where
environmental sustainability is the primary objective of
the SC [6]. At the same time, architects and urban
planners increasingly mix SC design with spatial
design and the creation of a “Sustainable User
Experience (UX)" or" Green UX" [7]. The major
contribution of this approach also lies in the suggestion
for a multidisciplinary approach to the SC as a way not
to "neutralize" the political dimension [8] inherent to
the planning of intelligent urban spaces, shifting away
from a neoliberal citizen-centric city that discourages
agonistic spaces and active inclusive participation [9].
Building on this, we make a proposal for a novel
periodization that accounts for Covid-19 unexpected
changes (Section 3).
The second part wants to focus on how the
concepts of citizenship and the right to the city could
be blended in a smart environment. Here, we rely on
the distinction between provisions and entitlements
advanced by the German sociologist Ralph
Dahrendorf. We argue whether benefiting from a SC
citizenship hinges on provisions or entitlements,
calling into the field of an unequal structure of (digital)
opportunities. In addition, we use Lefebvre’s radical
concept of "right to the city", formulated to criticize
liberal capitalism and its segregating effects on the
urban environment. Since its concept does not have a
legal but a performative meaning, we unveil possible
social conflicts and contradictions within the dominant
tech model of governance and management of SC that
prevents a full and meaningful participation.
Under this composite framework, we set out some
compelling research questions such as: how did the
debate on SC evolved over the last 25 years? What are
the analytical dimensions that better grasp the turning
points of this evolution? What is coming next? How
does the concept of citizenship adapt to a smart
environment? How does the right to city blend with it?

3. Methodology
We adopted a “systematic review method”, widely
applied in social sciences and public policy evaluation
studies [10]. We used different databases for review
(Scopus and Web of Science) detecting peer-reviewed
articles containing the terms ‘smart city/smart cities’ in
the title from 1990 to 2018. We restricted the search to

the Social Science subject area (SOCI for Web of
Science and SSCI Index for Scopus). The examination
of the most accredited literature that tried to
reconstruct the evolution of the debate on the smart
city drove us to choose the presented time
periodization. From this initial review, we first
collected more than 743 articles, but only 466 articles
really fit with the chosen subject area. After the
exclusion of duplicates and articles that did not fit to
our analysis, a sample of 364 articles was left. We
added to this sample also official documents and
reports from established institutions (like OECD),
reaching 396 items. The T-LAB software allowed an
analysis of the content through the co-occurrences of
the words used to construct the concept map, clustering
each group of words within the renewed theoretical
frame of Pardo and Nam. Building on the systematic
review and the most renowned contributions, we
explore SC phenomenon as a “global discourse
network” [11] proposing a novel periodization. Since it
is premature to seek established scientific or
institutional analysis, our efforts are oriented to offer
an
innovative
interpretative
analysis:
our
reconstruction of possible effects of the pandemic is
mostly speculative but grounded on a critical reflection
of events and political decisions that took place in the
last year. Our goal is to trigger new ideas and analysis
for a future research agenda and for innovative policy
tools. Therefore, this position paper offers a first
interpretative key about how to grasp the
transformation and evolution of narratives and policies
within the debate on smart cities.

4. SC through time: from “prodromal” to
“post-pandemic”? A proposal for
periodization
Building on the presented approach, we propose a
periodization of SC evolution over time that considers
four factors at the same time: technological, human,
spatial-environmental
and
institutional.
Acknowledging the still fuzzy nature of the concept of
SC, and through the literature review, we envision a
three stages time period through which it appeared,
consolidated, concurred and, then, assimilated other
emerging concepts (such as of sharing), and now it is
opening to a new formulation. We refer to these 3 steps
as "The Prodromal Smart City", "The Sharing City"
and the "Post-Pandemic Smart City" (fig.1).
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The Prodromal
Smart City
(1990-2012)

The Sharing City
(2013-2020)

The PostPandemic
Smart City
(2020-...)

Figure 1- The Three Phases of Smart City
Debate

4.1 The “Prodromal” Smart City
This first phase is a sort of early Nineties’ version
of a tech-extractive urban utopia, which mainly feeds
on the impulse of the high tech big players who began
to building a precise imaginary. As increasingly urban
centric, innovation is led by tech entrepreneurs fueled
with the Californian ideology [12] that hybridizes
participatory ideals, cyber-enthusiasm and economic
liberalism.
We can define it as a “prodromal” because it is the
stage when the concept of SC begins to take shape, the
first experimentations started to be relevant and 41% of
related articles appeared stressing the technological
dimensions through urban self-monitoring and selfreporting. It is not surprising the origins of such debate
were almost entirely attributable to the marketing
strategy of IBM and other tech multinationals that see
in the city a new market made of "complex networks of
interconnected systems" that monitor and measure
urban life, offering policy-makers more complete,
reliable and robust data to make the best decisions
[13]. IBM came out with a new concept and the “Smart
Planet” service package, soon followed by other firms
such as CISCO, Siemens and Ericsson. This new
package was meant to supply governments with smart
solutions
focused
mainly
on
transportation,
communications, healthcare, energy and utilities. This
promotional strategy culminated in the IBM project on
the “Smarter Cities Challenge” started in 2010, a
program that saw the company's experts providing
numerous free consultations to municipal governments
around the world. To date, IBM has offered its
consultancy services, through the “Smarter Cities
Challenge program”, to more than 130 cities
worldwide, choosing from over 600 applicants. More
than 800 IBM experts have offered free consultations
and services for an estimated value of $ 68 million.
This technocratic utopia has its symbol in the South
of the world: Rio de Janeiro – as our review outlines –
in 2009 launched the first large-scale SC project as

well as the debate of sustainable development. In
collaboration with Unicef and the Municipal
Secretariat of Health and Civil Defense, this project
focuses on the “smart favelas” where teenagers used
kites and mobile technology to map the favelas' social
and environmental hotspots, taking pictures of
potential risks such as piles of rubbish, streets’
dangerous spots and hazardous electricity cables. The
photos, tagged on a digital map, were used to detect
urgency to respond. The project becomes an example
of the "thaumaturgical" simplification of the
potentiality of SC in an troubled urban environment.
Another symbol is the Korean city of Songdo that, in
collaboration with Cisco, wanted to become the model
for the future of SC in Asia.
The greatest attention is clearly on the
technological dimension, focusing on a plurality of
enabling technological artifacts understood as "digital
infrastructure for communication and knowledge
management" embedded in the urban space [14]. Here,
the human dimension is understood as a
complementary "infrastructure" because SC also needs
smart people, their human capital, creativity and
participatory orientation. Citizens are "intelligent"
agents who use available skills to enjoy and reap off
the benefits. Their representation oscillates between
being consumers/users of city spaces and services, and
being innovative entrepreneurs capable of exploiting
the disruptive potential of a new urban paradigm. The
human is more instrumental to SC rather than central to it,
leading to exemplary failures such as that of Songdo. It
became a gated town of expensive housing and
international schools, stimulating regional and social
imbalances that testify that this top down driven utopia
bears troubles in the governance and stakeholder
participation.
The spatial-environmental dimension is strictly
intertwined to environmental sustainability since it was
the primary objective of initial SC’s formulations,
although a strong technological determinism seriously
undermined its originality. Furthermore, not
considering the historical-identity dimension of spaces
and activities totally underestimated the chances for
alternative development paths or ignored embedded
specificities within local economies.
The institutional dimensions looks at the role of
municipalities
that,
although
amplifier
and
(financially) promoter of this urban vision,
subordinated to the big tech players who provides
advice, devices and knowledge in areas where public
institutions are largely missing. In this embryonic
phase, SC appears as a "commodified" urban space that
legitimizes processes of extraction of value centralized
in the hands of few private actors who possess
adequate skills and technologies.
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4.2 The “Sharing” City
The economic crisis of 2008 put this narrative in
crisis and critical views on the SC asked for its reconfiguration as also municipalities were looking for
more reliable and contingent solutions. In 2013, a
cover of the Economist launched the term "sharing
economy", or a new digitally mediated peer2peer
economy, emerging as a response to the 2007-2008
economic crisis [15]. The narrative hybridizes the SC
idea with a new solution, opening up to the second
phase, the so-called “Sharing City” (2013-2020). The
overlap of the two phenomena holds on some
commonalities such as being urban phenomena, driven
by connectivity and information technologies, and
perceived as improving the quality of urban life through
a localized community or active/productive citizenconsumers. Almost one third of the articles about SC
contain an explicit reference to the sharing phenomenon.
Legitimation and impulse to change perspective are also
supported by the emerging promises of a platform
economy (experience like Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, Lyft) that
grafted into the urban environment. The European
Commission has strongly intercepted this idea with the
launch of "The Sharing Cities program” that is defined
as "a common approach to making smart cities a reality.
By fostering international collaboration between industry
and cities, the project seeks to develop affordable,
integrated, commercial-scale smart city solutions with a
high market potential". The Sharing Cities offers also a
“framework for citizen engagement and collaboration at
local level, thereby strengthening trust between cities
and citizens”.
Figure 2 compares the “prodromal” concept of SC with
its evolution as “sharing city” through an examination
of the keywords that emerge from the systematic
review, organized along the four dimensions of
analysis previously identified. Despite areas of
profound complementarity, the two models retain some
distinctive connotations.
In the new sharing phase, the technological
dimension becomes somehow implicit, focusing more
on the relevance of the exchange processes "taking
place in ways and on a scale not possible before the
internet" [16]. In many cases, the reference to
technology is assimilated into the platform
conceptualization [17], understood not only as a device
but as a new organizational system for innovative
smart services.
The human dimension becomes central and no
longer instrumental. People represent the "raw

material" of the "sharing city". It is no coincidence that
the concept of sharing economy derives its strength
from explicit references to the gift economy or
literature on social networks [18]. The sharing services
would be configured as a sui generis category of smart
services, in which the human factor is essential and the
platforms would appear as amplifiers of community
exchanges. People not only own the exchanged assets,
but often they are themselves the object of the
exchange, as their frame their life inside and outside
the platform.
The spatial and environmental factor within the
“sharing city” seems strongly related to the previous
dimension and somehow interlinked to idea of sharing
in itself as the enhancement and efficiency of idle
capacities in an exchange system, of "underutilized
assets, monetized or not, in ways that improve
efficiency, sustainability and community" [19]
empowered by digital technologies.
As for the institutional dimension, the increasing
relevance of the human and social factors led for
developing new governance and regulatory approaches
taking into greater account the cultural and social
differences of each context. The public actor is
somehow empowered, shifting from subordinated to
enabler of collaborative networks, trying to reach a
series of targets: developing a shared vision on the
benefits of sharing among the urban community;
promoting "shared" entrepreneurship and collaboration
networks between different collaborative service
providers; ensuring accessible technologies; engaging
dialogue and guidance for the development of solutions
and practices that respond to specific needs of the
urban community. Areas of intervention can be
variously traced in the principles contained in the
Shareable Cities Resolution, signed by fifteen major
cities of the United States, or in its European
counterpart, the European Sharing Economy Coalition
(EUROSHE). However, this coordination did not
exclude a higher diversification of urban policies and
approaches for the “sharing city” [20]: from the San
Francisco model, promoting the Sharing Economy
Working Group, a multi-stakeholder consultation
system on urban policies to the European model,
embodied by Amsterdam and Barcelona, centered
more on co-designed audits for regulatory solutions
that balance the benefits of sharing with the
minimization of risks in terms of commodification,
gentrification, or social exclusion; to the strongly topdown Seoul model, where the public actor acts not
only as a regulator but also as a direct financier of local
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Figure 2 –Comparing the Prodromal Smart City vs the Sharing City
experiences capable of being credible alternatives to
the bigger global players. The idea of a “sharing city”
as an enhanced human-centric SC, claiming greater
social inclusion and collaboration, started to lose its
legitimacy as its positive social effects were critically
questioned: gentrification effects (Airbnb); exploitation
of work (riders and Uber drivers); inequalities in
access and use to sharing services, rooted in social
exclusion and homophilia of transactional networks
(i.e. the case of digital time banks). Risks of value
extraction, commodification processes and urban
segregation are still evident. Furthermore, the
economic sustainability is questioned by the crisis of
the most relevant global players of sharing services in
terms of return on investments (Car2go and
BlaBlaCar), declining trust of investors (WeWork) as
well as hard confrontation with public regulators
(Airbnb and Uber).
4.3 The “Post-pandemic” Smart City (2020 - ?)
The 2020 pandemic sanctions, in our opinion, the
end of the “Sharing City” model, decreeing the

emergence of a "temporary" model of urban space
designed by technology but also new social models:
the “Post-pandemic” Smart City. Covid-19 triggered a
sudden and stringent reformulation of long-established
social processes, whose general consequences are still
under investigation (work and family relations;
mobility, sociability among many others), definitely in
need for specific comprehension when it comes to a
smart environment.
Considering the technological dimension, the
relevance of the principle of physical distancing calls
into question the opportunity of the previous model
mainly based on interaction and sociability, while the
use of smart and remote working, as a contingent
solution, confines sociality back into a domestic
dimension, even if strongly mediated by technology. It
is an interconnected “empty” city where the
technological dimension backlashes once again
pivoting towards a stricter focus on the infrastructural
networks and their capacity to support the increase in
traffic caused by the Covid-19 emergency.
Strengthening the digitalization of public and
private services (from delivery, to e-commerce and
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streaming, from electronic medical prescription to
digital education or tax electronic payments) becomes
a political priority, overcoming long-lasting processes
of social and cultural resistance typically embedded in
countries with a lower level of digital literacy or
digitization (especially Mediterranean and Eastern
European countries). Covid-19 forced us to turn to
digital services without any significant concern about
diversified skills and equipment among social groups
and with reduced opt out possibilities, putting the
digital divide again back at the center of policy issues.
This massive switch to the digital has been
accomplished without any regulatory mediation and
without considering the emergence of social
inequalities.
Human and social dimension flattens on the focus
on securitization, which also legitimizes the advent of
control and contact tracing tech solutions. The political
measures to contain individual freedoms lower the
perception of alert with respect to the risk of violation
of personal privacy. For example, in Taiwan,
municipality used active mobile network monitoring to
enforce home quarantine through a twice per day home
call to verify that the quarantined have not abandoned
their mobile device. Contact tracings apps –like
Immuni in Italy or StopCovid in France – are other
examples. Surveillance is one of the top issues for
citizens: the technical infrastructures allow levels of
recording, classification and control that are potentially
limitless.
Spatial and environmental dimension. The “Postpandemic Smart City” (see table 1) is an “uninhabited”
and vertically hyper-controlled city. However, as
nature temporarily re-appropriates the urban space, the
collapse of CO2 in major global cities (from Beijing to
Milan) with the decrease in urban mobility highlights
how environmental sustainability is not just a question
of a more or less technological urban environment but
it is heavily dependent on our economic-production

model. New studies ascertain a microparticulateCovid-19 strong relationship and propose the urban
agenda to maintain a 10 per cent drop in traffic
volumes in the recovery phase to significantly improve
their climate impact standing [21]. The “Postpandemic” smart city highlights how technology,
sustainability and smartness can only be combined
with a decrease of mobility and production activities.
Institutional dimension. As for now, there is a
revamp of the private-public partnership deemed an
effective solution. The public actor (the State rather
than the local municipality) negotiates collaboration
agreements with companies in a non-transparent way,
claiming its vertical power in an open conflict with the
decentralized ambitions of the Global Smart Cities.
The Chinese Model becomes the new benchmark: apps
such as Alipay and WeChat flagged high-risk
individuals, who were then quarantined or disallowed
from entering public spaces. As normalcy returns,
people are required to obtain a “green clearance” from
these apps to be allowed back into public life and
freely move. Datification of urban policies becomes a
priority: in a recent interview Philip James, director of
Newcastle Urban Observatory, argued how the Covid19 emergency demonstrated how having real time data
in cities is crucial for urban well-being: the provision
of hourly data (1.8 billion pieces of observational data
gathered from 3500 active sensors across the city)
proved how restrictions played out on the ground [22].
The “Post-pandemic” SC, despite its transitory model
with distinctive characteristics (see table 1), already
reveals a series of contradictions and taboos that
requires close scrutiny: the infrastructural limits to
access and load; the equipment differentiation and
technological skills; the lack of awareness about the
value of personal data and their economic exploitation;
the imperfect compatibility between sustainability and
smartness

Table 1. A comparative exercise through the periodization, along the technological (1), human
and social (2), spatial-environmental (3) and institutional (4) dimensions

1

Prodromal Smart City
Smart objects and devices
embedded in the urban environment

Sharing City
Sharing Platforms to enable new urban
services

Post -Pandemic Smart City
Top Down transition to
digital and tech surveillance
Physical distancing and
tech mediated relations
A decongested urban
space environmentally relieved
Governmental
centralization and PublicPrivate-Partnerships for new
data based Tech-solutions

2

Consumers or entrepreneurs of
smart services

Collaborative social networks

3

Urban Space as a commodity

Urban Space as an asset or a commons to
share and manage collaboratively
Municipality as enabler and coordinator of a
sharing environment

4

Smartness as a urban political
vision influenced by big tech players
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5. What role for (smart) citizens?
Aiming at better qualifying the human dimension
as intrinsically social, here we turn our attention to the
actual inhabitants of a SC, because – as Shakespeare
wrote – “what is the city if not the people?”. More
generally, here, we want to build up the concept of
“smart citizenship” upon the distinction between
provisions and entitlements advanced by German
sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf [2].
First of all, we should wonder what kind of citizen
inhabits a SC enhanced by the ICT revolution,
counting that the industrial revolution was a turning
point for provisions (of goods) while the French
revolution was a watershed for entitlements. In short,
provisions are goods and services freely available on
the market upon which citizens act their consumption
choices while entitlements are individual rights to
potentially choose and access those provisions. Their
sum reflects the structure of opportunity accessible to
individuals and social classes. This is strictly
intertwined to the degree of freedom each society
allows.
Adapting it to our periodization, the “Prodromal”
SC clearly puts an accent on the provisions, the
“Sharing City” reformulates and enlarges the variety of
provisions available and the “Post-Pandemic” city
should eventually focus on the entitlements. As a
matter of fact, choosing among an ample selection of
goods and services characterizes more a “consumer”
rather than a “citizen”: changes in the structure and
processes of production and delivery through smart
technological solutions could apparently democratize
consumption opportunities (e.g. costs reduction), but
could do nothing in terms of changing an unequal
structure of opportunities to access those goods and
services. That is to say, the SC does not change the
entitlements structure, equivalent to a “ticket entry”, to
those new provisions. More generally, the overall
rhetoric of SC does not solve preexistent inequalities
whether we look at access to housing, health and
education services. Especially the “prodromal” phase
ended up exacerbating what Dahrendorf calls the
“Martinez paradox”1: a stark contrast between
provisions without entitlements and entitlements
without provisions. In our case, only citizens with the
“right” (already privileged) entitlements could access
1

The anecdote refers to Dahrendorf meeting with Nicaragua’s
ministry of Commerce in 1986, Alejandro Martinez who
defended void stacks at the supermarket: the recent ’revolution’
brought along equal opportunities even in the absence of
sufficient provisions for all “citizens”. The opposite scenario sees
plenty of provisions accessible to only a restricted and privileged
elite (exemplary of less democratic and equal societies).

the new “smart” provisions. It is not surprise how the
roadmap to the “smart city utopia” [23] typically
started through coalitions of experts, consultants, city
officials, and big tech companies, aiming at generating
a (vague but) optimistic storytelling about the supposed
benefits of SC. In parallel, the roadmap worked to
construct an effective representation and bottom-up
legitimation, even before a considering the real urban
impact. In this discrepancy between vision and
practice, especially at the initial stages, the role of
citizens is limited to gathering opinions on what this
"prototype" should be like. As a matter of fact, citizens
have limited capacity and expectations about their
involvement to radically influence the project, which is
simply aimed at co-opting them for co-production, as
shown in a Japanese study on the activation of smart
communities [24].
Extending Dahrendorf reasoning and questioning
whether the second “Sharing City” phase brought any
changes, one could observe that the combination of a
sharing economy narrative with the SC rhetoric
obfuscated a substantial unmodified equilibrium.
Where the focus is on the provision side (as the sharing
economy literature teaches us), one may question
whether there is a problem in equal opportunities to
entitlements.
Within the “sharing city” we find the same vision
more oriented to co-production than to smart citizensled processes of deliberation. Although their role is not
limited to mere consultancy for service design, it is
intensely productive and even exploited. Without an
adequate cultural and civic awareness counterweight,
the access to sharing services is somehow unequal and
their use results in new social conflicts: in several cities
like Amsterdam, Paris or Bejing free-floated vehicle
sharing systems do not represent an universalistic
opportunity for mobility, have a high rate of vandalism
and incorrect use (like in the 70s’ pre-technological
experimentations), damaging both service providers (in
terms of economic profitability), municipality (in terms
of urban decorum) and users (in terms of efficiency of
the service). The pandemic could be a wake-up call for
the future of SC: the profound restructuring of
economic, social and political processes in both urban
and non-urban environments also paves the way to a
reformulation of the fuzzy concept under investigation.
Nowadays, we have sufficient knowledge for avoiding
past errors and really design a SC where citizens are at
its core.
To answer the initial question in the light of the
structure of opportunities the proposed periodization
allows us to qualify the SC inhabitants as “people”
rather than “citizens” in both the “Prodromal” and
“Sharing” SC. A chance for modifying – or at least not
deepening – existing inequalities is to develop a
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framework for a “smart citizenship” – less focused of
the consumer who access smart provisions in an
unchanged entitlements structure – is to open to the
“right to the city” literature.
Lefebvre’s radical concept of "right to the city" to
criticize liberal capitalism and its segregating effects
on the urban environment, is still worthy to orient a
progressive smart city policy. It could be declined as a
right to act and participate as well as a right to use and
accessibility. “The right to the city stresses the need to
restructure the power relations that underlie the
production of urban space, fundamentally shifting
control away from capital and the state and toward
urban inhabitants” [25]. The “Prodromal” SC is
somehow similar to the urban environment criticized
by Lefebvre in 1968: a segregating urban space, even
more privatized and commodified, subordinated to
private interests to extract and exploit the urban rent,
limiting accessibility and right to participate within the
urban space. The “Sharing City”, despite a brand new
imaginary built on collaboration, reproduce the same
inequalities both to access and participation within the
city: examples are providing car sharing services only
in areas of greater profitability and higher demand
while applying the extra-tariff system to discouraging
their use in peripheral areas or favoring central living
spaces to the city user market through short term
rentals more than to the housing needs of the
inhabitants [26]. The “Post-pandemic” SC does not
recognize any citizen's right to the city neither. On the
one hand, the smart citizen must be contained,
monitored and disciplined in a strongly top down
manner, as cases such as that of London’s Tube show
through constant monitoring and regulation through
underground access data. On the other, the great
current economic uncertainty questions the profitability
of smart city investments. The controversial Toronto
Waterfront and Sidewalk Labs project is now
definitively stopped but it was scaled down thanks to
Block Sidewalk campaign, a legal action launched over
citizen rights that produced the privacy advisor to
Sidewalk Labs resignation in 2018.
For this reason we think that after the pandemic, the
urban imaginary should consider the “right to the city”
of its future smart citizen as a viable way to reconcile
the four institutional dimensions of the SC paradigm.

6. Conclusions: how could “smart
citizens” really fit in the Post-pandemic
SC?
Since the modern age, social, technological and
environmental developments are associated to a
national or supranational entity while the last 50 years

attribute the driver for innovation and sustainable
development on the city. If the city turned from being a
danger to be the solution to save the planet [27], one
still needs to ponder on advantages and risks that such
a change brings about for a SC. Table 2 summarizes
and points to potential risks and opportunities in the
debate over policies on SC after the pandemic.
Covid-19 paved the way to identifying ‘new
problems’ (such as the changing patterns of mobility,
the restructuring of indoor and outdoor spaces such as
schools, movie theaters and so on) calling for different
urban governance strategies. If this is true, the concept
of SC faces a double challenge. First, it should
overcome some of its soft points by finding a balance
among technological infrastructure solutions, top-down
governance policies and the “forgotten” citizen (with
its community). A possible triangulation is to be found
in a mix of technology, organizational change and
participation. Second, by doing so, this solution should
fit in a continuously changing and adapting urban
vision, independently from Covid-19.
Solving this double challenge would also
counteract two previous dangers highlighted when the
SC is seen as the new actor in town for social,
economic and environmental development. On the one
side, there is a chance not to sell SC solutions as
“natural” and “univocal”. On the other, the risk of a
tech-centered single vision of SC should be
substantially contained in the “Post-pandemic” SC
compared to the “Prodromal” SC.
Technological dimension. During the pandemic, the
translation to smartness (education, training, working,
sociality, etc) was fast and reactive, but in the “Postpandemic” SC it should be planned, aware and
proactive through a regulatory effort to contain the
dominant position of the most important high-tech
players. As for now, the market sees a worrying
dominance of few big players (GAFAM in Western
countries or BATX in Asia) that exercise a control
through their oligopolies because, for example, they
enjoy the advantage of the first comers thanks to the
stickiness and lock-ins of technology.
As Zuboff [28] recently highlighted, capitalism has
entered a new phase where is classical capitalistic
dynamics (value extraction, market competition,
consumer control) moved to ICT technology to fully
grasp
its
potential
for
surveillance
and
commodification of the whole human experience. The
value extraction imperative exploits the available
technology to profit from data collected through
smartphones, sensors, CCTV cameras, while
transforming them into rents [29]. The triangulation
between ubiquitous technology, business search for
data and unaware citizen is on the plate to either be
contained (if not solved) or exacerbated.
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Table 2. Opportunities and risks in the evolution of the post pandemic SC paradigm
Dimensions

Opportunities

Risks

Technological

Smart transition as a public and political
target

Strengthening
tech
infrastructural lock-ins

Social

Smart citizenship as the core

Deepening social inequalities

Spatial-Environmental

Rethinking mobility and production for a
“real” sustainable transition

The Status quo “resistance”: hostility to
radical change in behavior and attitudes

Institutional

Deliberative democracy and (urban) open
government data

Political surveillance

Human and social dimension. Main challenges
are related to exacerbating existing inequalities
coupled with a consumer/people vision of SC. Seeing
people as an “infrastructure”, although relevant, does
miss the point of transforming people/consumers into
citizens. As it took time for other civil and social
“rights” to consolidate, it will take its journey to
develop a “smart citizenship”. A concrete peril is to
continue with a biased “smart” urbanism and datadriven governance that heavily affect and automate
inequalities [30] [31], eroding citizens’ invisibility and
privacy [32]. More specifically, a “Post-pandemic”
city will not only rely on technology and “smart”
urbanism but also on social policies intervening in
rebalancing those entitlements and making access to
SC more equal.
The focus on smart citizenship must become the
heart of the “Post-pandemic” SC design. Recovering
the lost "ethos" in the decline of the “Sharing city”,
requires considerable efforts in the promotion of the
ability to enhance the smart citizen's agency, not only
as a consumer, co-producer or as service enabler, but
also as a policy “hub” for urban planning. To do this
we must start from citizenry, understood as the ability
to exercise one's “right to the city”, working on tools
and skills, but also on the social awareness of roles
and commitments within the city. The public value of
citizen data and the limitations to their use, such us
the capability to develop a collective dimension of
citizen voice [33] in the urban environment are core
issues of this process as a way to guarantee both the
“right of access” and “the right to participate”. Ratti
and Claudel [34] propose a collaborative futurecraft
in which deliberation, accessibility to knowledge and
information, and co-production create the most fertile
and useful ecosystem for a real smart city.
Spatial-environmental dimension. The main
challenges here are related to the interference
between public and private space. The “onlife” way
of living [35] could also represent the blurring

oligopolies

and

between the top down (such as in the “postpandemic” SC) and the prosumer orientations for
digitally centralized proactive urban governance.
Smart citizens need more deliberative and
collective tools, taking strength also by the new
global and urban movements such as “Occupy”,
“Fridays for the future” or “Platform-cooperativism
movement” that were already praising for this kind of
change. Their contribution is also crucial for a true
green transition, capable to question and challenge
existing production models and imagine new ones
(e.g. through the rediscovery of peri-urban
agriculture, the organization of energy community
cooperatives, the long and short distance carpooling
models). The SC must be the ideal space for this
concrete "social" innovation because it is rich in
economic, cultural and social capital that can fuel this
experimentation.
Institutional dimensions. Main challenges relate
to the role the public could embody. What role and
vision should the public have? Why it should develop
it? Not only a facilitator for bottom-up processes that
are way to difficult to manage and sustain than just
giving out money for “smart” initiatives. Its role
should be propulsive, regulatory while empowering.
On a continuum we have two opposite ideal cases:
the first scenario sees government in active
coordination with citizens to co-design smart
initiatives for the public good while the second
scenario sees the government manipulatively profit
from potential for control. The USA and the EU have
their differences but they project thoughtful and more
cautious experiments while China is more audacious
in launching a “social credit system”, heavily
organized around control and surveillance. Around
the world, the idea of smartness (and SC) is
becoming an applied field for social control under the
shield of surveillance offered by the technical
infrastructure becoming more and more normalized
and, thus, socially accepted. Covid-19 has
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dramatically shown how under emergency
circumstances the process of normalization spikes.
We conclude by highlighting how difficult and
critical is to develop a framework that really serves
citizen empowerment. Previous SC schemes did not
quite serve the purpose as they were only built
around the magic bullet of “technology”. Technology
could be effectively connected to citizens (and vice
versa) without curtailing their rights and entitlements.
Future schemes could benefit from a more diversified
stream of research, going from technology to
innovation, citizenship rights, co-created and codesigned policy. There is a need for a shifting away
from the “smart” city to the “smart” people, from
smart urbanism to “sustainable urbanism for smart
citizen(ship)”.
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